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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter is before this court on an appeal from an 
order for summary judgment in this diversity of citizenship 
commercial litigation dispute. The litigation stems from a 
series of business relationships formed to finance, 
construct and operate a waste paper recycling facility in 
Sanford, West Virginia (the "Project"). The owner/developer 
of the project was American Power Recyclers, L.P., later 
known as American Fiber Resources, Limited Partnership 
(the "Partnership"). The Partnership included two general 
partners and two limited partners. The general partners 
were American Power Corporation ("APC"), the predecessor- 
in-interest to the plaintiff, Sanford Investment Company, 
Inc., and Adirondack G.P. Inc. ("AGP"). AGP is related to 
Ahlstrom Kamyr, Inc., the predecessor-in-interest to 
defendant Ahlstrom Machinery Holdings, Inc. We refer to 
the Ahlstrom entitites simply as "Ahlstrom" although the 
contracting party was Ahlstrom Kamyr, Inc. and the party 
to the litigation is Ahlstrom Machinery Holdings, Inc. The 
limited partners were Adirondack Recycle, L.P. ("ARLP"), a 
company related to Ahlstrom, and American Power 
Investors ("API"), a company related to APC. We will refer to 
the appellant Sanford and its predecessor-in-interest APC 
as "American" but it should not be confused with American 
Fiber Resources, i.e., the Partnership. 
 
On November 2, 1993, the Partnership entered into a 
contract with Ahlstrom referred to as the "EPC/Initial 
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Operation and Performance Testing Agreement" ("EPC 
contract"). The EPC contract provided that Ahlstrom would 
develop, construct and initially operate the Project. In 
return, the Partnership agreed to pay Ahlstrom an amount 
designated as the "Base Fee" during the initial operation of 
the Project. A different paragraph of the EPC contract 
provided that the Partnership would pay Ahlstrom a"Bonus 
Fee" under certain conditions. The Base Fee and the Bonus 
Fee were distinct payments under the EPC contract 
calculated in different ways. Moreover, the Bonus Fee, 
unlike the Base Fee, was conditional. The EPC contract 
provided the circumstances in which Ahlstrom was to 
receive the Base Fee, which is at issue in this lawsuit. 
 
After the execution of the EPC contract, Ahlstrom and 
American negotiated a division of the Base Fee that they 
memorialized in a Letter Agreement dated December 29, 
1993 (the "1993 Letter Agreement"). The 1993 Letter 
Agreement provides that 
 
       25% of the base fee payable to [Ahlstrom] under Phase 
       II of the EPC/Initial Operation and Performance 
       Testing Agreement shall be payable by [Ahlstrom] to 
       [American]. 
 
American predicates this action on Ahlstrom's purported 
obligation to remit this 25% payment as set forth in the 
1993 Letter Agreement. American contends that Ahlstrom 
breached the contract as of January 31, 1996, by failing to 
remit payments of that portion of the Base Fee due under 
the 1993 Letter Agreement. 
 
The background surrounding this breach of contract case 
was complicated by three agreements entered into following 
the execution of the foregoing basic agreements. In 1995, 
the Partnership sought additional funding from the County 
Commission of Marion County, West Virginia ("Marion 
County"). Marion County contemplated obtaining the 
additional funding through the issuance of tax-free 
industrial development bonds. 
 
A problem with the funding arose, however, because 
American was in default of its obligation under a Cash 
Shortfall Funding Agreement (the "CSF Agreement") dated 
February 13, 1995. Apparently, Marion County would not 
 
                                3 
  
approve the additional funding unless American satisfied its 
obligations under the CSF Agreement. 
 
To cure its default under the CSF Agreement and clear 
the way for the additional funding, American sought a loan 
from one of its affiliates, the Conduit and Foundation 
Corporation ("Conduit" or "C&F "). It was contemplated that 
the loan would be funded by monies due and owing to 
Conduit from Kamtech, Inc. ("Kamtech"), an affiliate of 
Ahlstrom that Ahlstrom hired to construct the Project. 
 
The plan called for Conduit to loan American the funds 
owed to it by Kamtech so that American could meet its 
obligation under the CSF Agreement and thus permit the 
Partnership to receive additional funds from Marion 
County. In order for Conduit to loan the funds due from 
Kamtech to American the approval of Conduit's surety, 
National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, was required. 
 
The arrangements among the parties arising from these 
circumstances were evidenced in three documents executed 
in December 1995. The parties refer to the first document 
as the "Bonus Fee Agreement" and the second document 
which accompanied the first as the "Bonus Fee 
Assignment." The final agreement was the "Surety Loan 
Agreement." The Bonus Fee Agreement and Bonus Fee 
Assignment were executed on December 20, 1995, and the 
Surety Loan Agreement was executed on December 26, 
1995. The parties to this litigation dispute the legal effect of 
these agreements, in particular language found in the 
Surety Loan Agreement. Because the terms of the three 
contracts are central to the outcome of the appeal, we set 
forth their relevant provisions in some detail. 
 
Each member of the Partnership signed the Bonus Fee 
Agreement: (1) AGP (Ahlstrom's affiliate); (2) American; (3) 
ARLP (Ahlstrom's affiliate); and (4) API (American's affiliate). 
Among other things, the Bonus Fee Agreement provided for 
an "assignment" of 24% of the Bonus Fee due to Ahlstrom 
under the EPC contract to American or its affiliate. 
Paragraph 4 states in pertinent part: 
 
       Assignment of 24% of the Bonus Fee to APC. AGP shall 
       cause its Affiliate, [Ahlstrom], to deliver to [American] 
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       or its designee upon the closing of the Bond Offering 
       an Assignment . . . through which [Ahlstrom] assigns, 
       sells and transfers to [American] or its designee, the 
       right to receive twenty-four percent (24%) of 
       [Ahlstrom's] Bonus Fee under paragraph 13.3 of the 
       EPC Contract, as amended (the `Bonus Fee'), when 
       earned. . . . AGP acknowledges that APC has 
       designated The Conduit and Foundation Corporation 
       (`C&F ') [an affiliate of American] as its designee under 
       this paragraph 4. 
 
        . . . . 
 
        [O]nce the amount of the Bonus Fee has been finally 
       determined in accordance with the EPC Contract, 
       [American] shall have the right thereafter to assert a 
       claim for its 24% of such Bonus Fee directly against 
       [the Partnership and original signatory to the EPC 
       Contract] and the payment of such amount to C&F or 
       National Union (as defined below) shall not be subject 
       to offset against the obligations of [American]. Nothing 
       in this Agreement is intended to, nor shall, give 
       [American] or its designee or any of their Affiliates any 
       additional rights or obligations under the EPC 
       Contract, including, but not limited to, any rights as a 
       third party beneficiary to the EPC Contract, except as 
       they may currently possess as a General or Limited 
       Partner and except for the right to enforce payment of 
       the 24% of the Bonus Fee assigned to [American] as 
       hereinabove provided. 
 
App. at 112-13 (second emphasis added). With respect to 
National Union's rights under the Bonus Fee Agreement, 
section 8(k) provides: 
 
       Limitation on Rights of Others. No person or entity other 
       that the parties hereto shall have any legal or equitable 
       right or interest, remedy or claim under or in respect of 
       this Agreement; provided, however, that it is 
       acknowledged that C&F and its surety, National Union 
       . . . are creditor and/or donee third party beneficiaries 
       in respect of the rights of [American] to receive the 24% 
       of the Bonus Fee assigned to it pursuant to paragraph 
       4 hereof and to enforce the payment of said amount 
       against [the Partnership] as hereinabove provided. 
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App. at 115. 
 
The second agreement, the Bonus Fee Assignment, was 
executed by Ahlstrom as assignor and Conduit as assignee 
and designee of American in the form that accompanied the 
Bonus Fee Agreement. The Bonus Fee Assignment 
effectuates the assignment of Ahlstrom's interest in 24% of 
the Bonus Fee provided under the EPC contract to Conduit 
as American's designee. The Assignment provides in 
relevant part: 
 
       1. Assignor [Ahlstrom] hereby assigns, sells  and 
       transfers to Assignee [Conduit], and Assignee hereby 
       accepts the assignment of, the right to receive . . . 
       twenty-four percent (24%) of Assignor's Bonus Fee 
       under . . . the EPC Contract, . . . when earned. 
 
App. at 120. The provisions in the Bonus Fee Assignment 
that follow the foregoing quoted language reiterate again 
American's right (as Conduit's affiliate) to assert a claim 
against the Partnership to collect its portion of the Bonus 
Fee provided in the EPC Contract assigned to it under this 
assignment. The next paragraph then provides the 
following: 
 
       4. Assignee [Conduit] hereby irrevocably dir ects that 
       any amounts otherwise payable to it with respect to the 
       24% of the Bonus Fee assigned to it hereby shall be 
       paid directly to [National Union], and Assignor 
       [Ahlstrom] hereby agrees to so pay any such amounts 
       that it shall receive from AFR. . . . It is acknowledged 
       that [National Union] is a creditor and/or donee third 
       party beneficiary in respect of the right to receive and 
       enforce payment of the 24% Bonus Fee assigned to 
       Assignee as provided herein. 
 
App. at 115 (emphasis added). Thus, under the Bonus Fee 
Agreement and Assignment, Ahlstrom assigned its right to 
receive 24% of the Bonus Fee to Conduit, which was the 
designee of American (as set forth in the Bonus Fee 
Agreement). By the assignment, Conduit, as assignee, 
received the right to enforce payment of 24% of the Bonus 
Fee from the Partnership, and National Union was deemed 
the third-party beneficiary of the assignment. Moreover, 
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Ahlstrom was to pay Conduit's portion of the Bonus Fee by 
sending it directly to National Union. 
 
As we have indicated, the third and final agreement 
evidencing the parties' arrangement is the Surety Loan 
Agreement, which the following parties executed: (1) 
American; (2) API (American's affiliate); (3) Conduit 
(American's affiliate); (4) Richard Halloran (Conduit's 
indemnitor under prior March 1995 Surety Agreement); and 
(5) National Union (the Surety). In the Surety Loan 
Agreement, National Union agreed to defer receipt of funds 
Conduit owed to it, and permitted the funds to be used by 
American to satisfy its obligations under the CSF. In 
return, American and its affiliates agreed to the following 
provision: 
 
       4. In further consideration of the Surety's consen t to 
       the deferral by Conduit of the receipt of the Loaned 
       Funds [i.e., the monies due from Kamtech],[American 
       and its affiliates]: 
 
        A. hereby transfer, assign, convey, gr ant a security 
       interest in, pledge and mortgage to [National Union] all 
       income, dividends, distributions, loan repayments, 
       proceeds . . . related in any way to the Project, or any 
       other payments of any kind payable to [American or its 
       affiliates] or any of their designees from[the 
       Partnership], [Ahlstrom], AGP, ARLP, Kamtech or any 
       of their designees . . . (including but not limited to the 
       Bonus Fees . . .) coupled with the rights to enforce the 
       payments of same . . . as further collateral security and 
       as a source for the repayment of all indebtedness of 
       [the signatories] under the Contractor/Surety 
       Agreement and this Surety Loan Agreement. 
 
App. at 85 (emphasis added). Unlike the Bonus Fee 
Agreement and Bonus Fee Assignment, Ahlstrom was not a 
signatory to the Surety Loan Agreement. To implement the 
Surety Loan Agreement, American sent Ahlstrom a letter 
dated March 27, 1996, directing that all payments related 
to the recycling facility be paid directly to National Union. 
 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Notwithstanding its assignment to National Union, 
American filed this action in December 1997, to recover 
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from Ahlstrom $324,470, together with interest, an amount 
allegedly representing that portion of the Base Fee, i.e., 
25% owed to it under the 1993 Letter Agreement. According 
to the complaint, American had received payments under 
the 1993 Letter Agreement through January 31, 1996, but 
not thereafter. Ahlstrom filed a motion for summary 
judgment on July 8, 1998, contending that American did 
not have standing to sue Ahlstrom for its percentage of the 
Base Fee due under the 1993 Letter Agreement because it 
had assigned its right to enforce that agreement to National 
Union in the Surety Loan Agreement. 
 
The district court heard oral argument on the matter on 
October 8, 1998, and on October 16, 1998, entered an 
order granting Ahlstrom's motion. Then on October 29, 
1998, the court entered a memorandum in support of its 
order. 
 
The district court determined that American lacked 
standing to sue Ahlstrom for the Base Fee payments under 
the 1993 Letter Agreement because of its complete 
assignment of that right to National Union pursuant to the 
Surety Loan Agreement. Under Pennsylvania law, which the 
parties treat as applicable, a contracting party that has 
assigned its contract rights to a third party does not have 
standing to enforce that contract. See West Penn Admin., 
Inc. v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 433 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1981). While the district court accepted American's 
argument that the Surety Loan Agreement should be read 
together with the Bonus Fee Agreement and Bonus Fee 
Assignment because the three agreements were part of a 
larger transaction, the court nonetheless determined that 
nothing in the prior agreements rendered ambiguous the 
unequivocal language of the assignment in the Surety Loan 
Agreement. 
 
American appeals from the district court's order granting 
Ahlstrom's motion. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 and exercise plenary review. See Nelson v. Upsala 
College, 51 F.3d 383, 385 (3d Cir. 1995); Allegheny Int'l, 
Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 40 F.3d 1416, 1423 
(3d Cir. 1994). 
 




American contends that the district court's interpretation 
of the Bonus Fee Agreement, Bonus Fee Assignment, and 
Surety Loan Agreement was erroneous. It maintains that it 
has offered an interpretation of the Surety Loan Agreement 
which is reasonable given the language used and the 
circumstances surrounding the series of transactions. 
Accordingly, it contends that summary judgment was 
inappropriate because the relevant provision in the Surety 
Loan Agreement was ambiguous. American further 
contends that the district court erred in not construing the 
three contracts together, by not considering the commercial 
context in which the agreements were executed, and by not 
addressing Ahlstrom's subsequent performance under the 
1993 Letter Agreement even though its conduct was 
consistent with American's construction of the agreements. 
This reference to subsequent performance related to 
Ahlstrom's payment in January 1996, after the execution of 
the Surety Loan Agreement, of a portion of the Base Fee 
directly to American. Finally, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17, 
American contends that the district court failed to weigh 
the fact that American was the real party in interest to the 
Surety Loan Agreement. 
 
"To affirm a grant of summary judgment on an issue of 
contract interpretation, we must conclude that the 
contractual language is subject to only one reasonable 
interpretation." Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf Coast 
Trailing Co., 180 F.3d 518, 521 (3d Cir. 1999). Thus, the 
overarching question on appeal is whether American has 
provided a reasonable alternative reading of the assignment 
clause in the Surety Loan Agreement under which Ahlstrom 
would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
 
A court's purpose in examining a contract is to interpret 
the intent of the contracting parties, as they objectively 
manifest it. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 1995); Mellon Bank, N.A. 
v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1009 (3d Cir. 
1980). The process of interpreting a contract proceeds in 
two steps. First, the court must make a preliminary inquiry 
as to whether the contract before it is ambiguous. See 
Duquesne, 66 F.3d at 613; Allegheny, 40 F.3d at 1424. This 
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question is an issue of law for the court to resolve. A term 
is ambiguous if it is susceptible to reasonable alternative 
interpretations. See Duquesne, 66 F.3d at 614; Mellon 
Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011 (defining ambiguity as an 
"[i]ntellectual uncertainty [or] the condition of admitting two 
or more meanings, of being understood in more than one 
way, or referring to two or more things at the same time 
. . . ."). If the court determines that a given term in a 
contract is ambiguous, then the interpretation of that term 
is a question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve in light 
of the extrinsic evidence offered by the parties in support of 
their respective interpretations. See Hullett v. Towers, 
Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 38 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
"In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, the 
court assumes the intent of the parties to an instrument is 
embodied in the writing itself, and when the words are clear 
and unambiguous the intent is to be discovered only from 
the express language of the agreement." Pacitti v. Macy's, 
193 F.3d 766, 773 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing and quoting 
Hullett, 38 F.3d at 111) (quotation marks omitted); 
Allegheny, 40 F.3d at 1424. Nevertheless, in that 
undertaking a court is not always confined to the four 
corners of a document. Rather, it may not be apparent 
whether a contract is ambiguous without an examination of 
the context in which the contract was made. See Hullett, 38 
F.3d at 111; see also Pacitti, 193 F.3d at 773 (noting that 
in determining if a contract is ambiguous, court is not 
confined to its four corners and may read the contract in 
the context in which it was made). Therefore, to determine 
the parties' intentions, the court may consider, among 
other things, "the words of the contract, the alternative 
meaning suggested by counsel, and the nature of the 
objective evidence to be offered in support of that meaning." 
Hullett, 38 F.3d at 111 (quoting Mellon Bank , 619 F.2d at 
1011). 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, "when two or more writings are 
executed at the same time and involve the same 
transaction, they should be construed as a whole." Western 
United Assurance Co. v. Hayden, 64 F.3d 833, 842 (3d Cir. 
1995) (citations omitted). If the court finds that the 
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contracts pertain to the same transaction, the fact that the 
signatories are different does not mean that this rule does 
not apply. See id. This rule applies equally where several 
agreements are made as part of one transaction even 
though they are executed at different times. See id. 
 
In this case, the district court concluded that the Surety 
Loan Agreement was unambiguous and capable of only one 
reasonable interpretation -- i.e., American assigned 
National Union the right to enforce the Base Fee 
arrangement set forth in the 1993 Letter Agreement. Thus, 
because the Surety Loan Agreement effectuated a complete 
assignment to National Union, American, as the assignor of 
the right to receipt of the Base Fee, did not retain the right 
to sue Ahlstrom for its portion of the Base Fee as provided 
under the 1993 Letter Agreement. 
 
American contends, however, that there is a reasonable 
alternative interpretation of the assignment of rights 
embodied in the Surety Loan Agreement when it is 
considered together with the Bonus Fee Agreement and 
Bonus Fee Assignment as a unified transaction. Its 
interpretation begins with the language of the Surety Loan 
Agreement, recognizing that by its terms, American and its 
affiliates assigned to the Surety "all income .. . related in 
any way to the Project . . . (including but not limited to the 
Bonus Fees . . .) coupled with the rights to enforce the 
payments of same. . . ." American states that while this 
language makes it clear that American and Conduit 
assigned to National Union certain rights with respect to 
the Base Fee and the Bonus Fee, "the nature and extent of 
the rights assigned are less than clear." It then turns to the 
language in the Bonus Fee Agreement and Bonus Fee 
Assignment which designates National Union as a"third- 
party beneficiary" of Conduit's right to receive the Bonus 
Fee from Ahlstrom as effectuated by the assignment. 
Pointing to that language, it claims that "[c]onstruing these 
documents together . . . the Surety's right to receive `all 
income' from the Project and to `enforce payments' of the 
income [quoting from the Surety Loan Agreement], are the 
rights of a third-party beneficiary, not a promisee." 
 
Thus, by a "parity of reasoning," it concludes that if the 
surety was assigned a third-party beneficiary interest in the 
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Bonus Fee, National Union also was assigned a third-party 
beneficiary interest with respect to Ahlstrom's payment of 
the Base Fee and any other income from the Project. Of 
course, interpreting the assignment in the Surety Loan 
Agreement in this manner would inure to American's 
benefit, as "both a promisee and an intended third party 
beneficiary may sue to enforce a contract." See In re 
Kaplan, 143 F.3d 807, 813 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying Illinois 
law); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts  S 305 
(1981) (describing promisor's overlapping duties to 
beneficiary and promisee). 
 
Applying the standards of contract interpretation 
discussed above, we reject American's alternate 
interpretation which would compel the conclusion that the 
relevant provision in the Surety Loan Agreement is 
ambiguous. The plain language of the assignment found in 
paragraph four of the Surety Loan Agreement, states that 
American and its affiliates hereby "transfer, assign, convey 
. . . to [National Union] all income . . . related in any way 
to the Project, or any other payments of any kind payable 
to [American and its affiliates] . . . (including but not 
limited to the Bonus Fees) . . . coupled with the rights to 
enforce the payments of the same." This language 
inescapably and unambiguously expresses an intent to 
assign to National Union all of the assignors' rights to 
income or payments of any kind, along with the rights to 
enforce the same. See Western United, 64 F.3d at 838. 
There is no language in this paragraph limiting in any way 
National Union's interest in the assigned property; nor is 
there any language which indicates that the assignment 
should be construed as partial rather than complete. See 
Gordon v. Hartford Sterling Co., 179 A. 234, 236 (Pa. 1935) 
("Where part of a chose in action has been assigned, the 
assignor and the assignee may unite in a suit for the 
enforcement of the chose; the assignor may sue alone, but 
the assignee may not sue on it in his own name."); see also 
6A Charles Allan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure S 1545, at 351-53 (2d ed. 1990). 
 
While, as we have indicated, the plain language of the 
assignment informs our result, we also observe that an 
examination of the Bonus Fee Agreement, Bonus Fee 
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Assignment, and Surety Loan Agreement demonstrates that 
the three agreements are complementary rather than 
contradictory and are consistent with the plain language of 
the Surety Loan Agreement. Clearly, the Bonus Fee 
Agreement, Bonus Fee Assignment, and Surety Loan 
Agreement each represent distinct aspects of the overall 
transaction among the parties and accomplish different 
results. Because each document sets forth different aspects 
of the overall transaction, the provisions of each must be 
understood in that context and applied so as to recognize 
their distinct purpose. See Shehadi v. Northeastern Nat'l 
Bank, 378 A.2d 304, 306 (Pa. 1977); Flatley v. Penman, 632 
A.2d 1342, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). Thus, we consider 
the documents together. 
 
The first document is the Bonus Fee Agreement, entered 
into by the four members of the Partnership, AGP, ARLP, 
API and American. The only relevant aspect of the Bonus 
Fee Agreement for purposes of this analysis is its provision 
which states that AGP (Ahlstrom's affiliate) agrees to cause 
Ahlstrom to effectuate an assignment of its right to 24% of 
the Bonus Fee to American's designee Conduit. The second 
document, the Bonus Fee Assignment, in turn, is an 
assignment between Ahlstrom (as assignor) and Conduit (as 
assignee and the designee of American). Its purpose was to 
assign or transfer Ahlstrom's right to 24% of the Bonus Fee 
under the EPC contract to Conduit. National Union was not 
a signatory to either the Bonus Fee Agreement or the 
Bonus Fee Assignment. 
 
The third document, the Surety Loan Agreement, 
effectuated an assignment from American and its affiliates 
(as assignors) to National Union (as assignee). We repeat 
that the document assigned to National Union "all income 
. . . related in any way to the Project . . . or any other 
payments of any kind payable to [American and its 
affiliates] . . . from [Ahlstrom and its affiliates] (including 
but not limited to the Bonus Fees) . . . coupled with the 
rights to enforce the payments of same. . . ." Ahlstrom was 
not a signatory to the Surety Loan Agreement. The Surety 
Loan Agreement, with its broad-based assignment of all of 
American's and its affiliates' rights to any income or 
payments received from the Project, by its very terms had 
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to occur subsequently to Ahlstrom's assignment to Conduit. 
After all, prior to the execution of the Bonus Fee Agreement 
and Bonus Fee Assignment, Conduit had no right or 
interest in the Bonus Fee to assign to National Union. 
Moreover, the assignment in the Surety Loan Agreement 
was central to completion of the overall transaction, as it 
was bargained for in exchange for National Union's 
agreement to permit Conduit to loan the funds to American 
so that American could meet its obligations under the CSF 
Agreement. 
 
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, there is nothing 
in the Bonus Fee Agreement or Bonus fee Assignment 
which is inconsistent with the assignment in the Surety 
Loan Agreement. The only assignment in the Bonus Fee 
Assignment was from Ahlstrom (assignor) to Conduit 
(assignee) of Ahlstrom's right to receive 24% of Ahlstrom's 
Bonus Fee as set forth in the EPC contract. ("Assignor 
hereby assigns . . . to Assignee . . . the right to receive . . . 
twenty-four percent (24%) of Assignor's Bonus Fee under 
paragraph 13.3 of the EPC Contract."). Thus, the Bonus 
Fee Assignment did not effectuate an "assignment" from 
Conduit to National Union of Conduit's right to a portion of 
the Bonus Fee. To be sure, the agreement directed that any 
amounts otherwise payable to Conduit with respect to 24% 
of the Bonus Fee assigned to it by Ahlstrom should be paid 
directly to National Union as Surety. However, that 
arrangement is not the legal equivalent of an express 
assignment of rights. See 3 E. Allan Farnsworth, 
Farnsworth on Contracts S 11.3, at 69 (2d ed. 1998) 
(discussing transactions which would not qualify as 
assignments, and providing the following example: 
"Sometimes an obligee (B) orders the obligor (A) to pay a 
debt to a third person (C), rather than the obligee. If the 
order is given directly to the obligor (A), courts have little 
difficulty in concluding that the obligee did not intend to 
make an assignment. . . ."). 
 
Moreover, the designation in the Bonus Fee Agreement 
and Bonus Fee Assignment of National Union as the third- 
party beneficiary is entirely consistent with American's and 
its affiliates' subsequent complete assignment to National 
Union of the rights to any income or payments related to 
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the Project. National Union's designation as a third-party 
beneficiary in the Bonus Fee Assignment and subsequent 
status as an assignee which received not only an 
unencumbered right to the Bonus Fee but also the right to 
"any income" or "any other payments of any kind" owed to 
American and its affiliates, does not render the third-party 
beneficiary provision in the Bonus Fee Assignment 
inconsistent with the assignment in the Surety Loan 
Agreement. 
 
We acknowledge that the assignment in the Surety Loan 
Agreement elevated National Union's rights from the status 
of a third-party beneficiary (as articulated in the Bonus Fee 
Assignment) to that of an assignee. In that regard, however, 
the assignment in the Surety Loan Agreement cannot be 
viewed as irreconcilable with the third-party beneficiary 
designation in the Bonus Fee Assignment. Cf. Flatley, 632 
A.2d at 1344 (where appellee sought construction of one 
paragraph of release which flatly conflicted with next 
paragraph of release, court invoked rule of construction 
that terms in contract should be read as consistent with 
one another, and one part should not be construed so as to 
nullify other terms). Indeed, for National Union to have any 
interest in the Bonus Fee Assignment, it had to be 
designated as a third-party beneficiary in that agreement, 
or at the very least clearly have been intended by the 
parties to the agreement to be its intended beneficiary, as 
it was not a party to that agreement. See Visor Builders, 
Inc. v. Devon E. Tranter, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 911, 923 (M.D. 
Pa. 1978) (noting that a third-party beneficiary is "one who, 
although not a party to the contract, and hence, not in 
privity with the promisor . . . is permitted to enforce the 
contract between the promisor and the promisee for its (the 
third-party beneficiary's) benefit"). 
 
As we set forth above, assignments in the Bonus Fee 
Assignment and the Surety Loan Agreement occurred 
sequentially and involved different assignors and assignees. 
Accordingly, the provisions of each assignment must be 
interpreted with that reality in mind. When viewed in that 
light, it is clear that the parties' designation of National 
Union as a third-party beneficiary in the Bonus Fee 
Assignment is wholly consistent with its later status as an 
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assignee in the Surety Loan Agreement, given the sequence 
of events and the contemplated structure of the overall 
transaction. Thus, we reject American's contention that the 
Surety Loan Agreement, if read as a complete assignment, 
is inconsistent with the third-party beneficiary designation 
in the Bonus Fee Agreement and Assignment. 
 
Finally, there is nothing in the Surety Loan Agreement 
indicating that the parties intended that American's right to 
collect any delinquent payments owed to it, i.e. , 25% of the 
Base Fee, would be preserved. In any event, the Bonus Fee 
Assignment does not include a "reservation of rights" clause 
that theoretically could be imported into the Surety Loan 
Agreement so that the latter document could be interpreted 
as having reserved in American a right to sue Ahlstrom for 
25% of the Base Fee. Paragraph three of the Bonus Fee 
Assignment merely declares Conduit's right (as assignee) to 
enforce payment of 24% of the Bonus Fee. Because Conduit 
assigned that right to National Union by virtue of the 
Surety Loan Agreement, the rights declared in paragraph 
three of the Bonus Fee Assignment cannot be imported into 
the Surety Loan Agreement. As previously mentioned, the 
Bonus Fee Assignment and the Surety Loan Agreement 
were two distinct documents with two distinct purposes. 
Thus, a clause in the former document cannot be imported 
wholesale into the latter so as to create an ambiguity where 
none exists on the face of the Surety Loan Agreement. In 
this regard we point out that even when several 
instruments pertaining to one transaction are considered 
together, the instruments do not become a single document 
for all purposes. See USX Corp. v. Prime Leasing Inc., 988 
F.2d 433, 437-38 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Additionally, as Ahlstrom correctly observes, American's 
right as a promisee under the Bonus Fee Agreement to sue 
the Partnership for unpaid Bonus Fees  is unhelpful in 
determining whether the Surety Loan Agreement similarly 
preserves American's right to sue Ahlstrom for unpaid Base 
Fees. As our emphasis indicates, there is language in the 
Bonus Fee Agreement that sets forth with particularity 
American's right to sue the Partnership, not Ahlstrom, 
should American not receive any portion of the Bonus Fee 
due under that agreement. Moreover, the right to sue, 
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which the Bonus Fee Agreement provides, is for the Bonus 
Fees, not the Base Fee. Accordingly, if we were to adopt 
American's "reasonable alternative interpretation" of these 
agreements, not only would we have to import language 
from the Bonus Fee Agreement to the Surety Loan 
Agreement, after we imported it we next would have to 
stretch and mangle the language to reach the conclusion 
that the Surety Loan Agreement's broad assignment also 
was intended to preserve American's right to sue Ahlstrom 
for the Base Fee. The parties are highly sophisticated and 
have demonstrated their ability to create third-party 
beneficiary rights when they saw fit, and to create an 
assignment where they deemed one appropriate. They will 
get no help from us in rewriting the plain terms of their 
agreements. 
 
For each of these reasons, we find that these agreements, 
while part of the same transaction, clearly and purposefully 
accomplished distinct results. This conclusion renders the 
Bonus Fee Agreement, Bonus Fee Assignment and Surety 
Loan Agreement entirely consistent, and confirms our 
determination that the assignment in the Surety Loan 
Agreement unambiguously conveyed American's right to 
sue for 25% of the Base Fee to National Union. 
 
Finally, we reject American's subsequent performance 
argument. While it does appear that Ahlstrom made a Base 
Fee payment to American in January 1996 after the 
execution of the Surety Loan Agreement, we see no 
significance to that payment as Ahlstrom was not a party to 
the agreement and it made the payment before the 
execution of the March 27, 1996 letter directing it to make 




For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the district 
court's order of summary judgment entered October 16, 
1998, to Ahlstrom. Plainly American does not have standing 
as the real party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17. 
American completely assigned its right to enforce payment 
under the 1993 Letter Agreement to National, and 
consequently, American lacks standing to sue Ahlstrom. 
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